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US13-VINCENZI 
PRIVACY AND UNMANNED AERIAL SYSTEMS INTEGRATION IN 
THE NATIONAL AIRSPACE SYSTEM: NAVIGATING FOURTH 
AMENDMENT CONCERNS 
Dennis Vincenzi, * David Ison, t and Dahai Liu+ 
A variety of challenges to the successful assimilation of UASs into the 
National Airspace System (NAS) cunently exist. Technical issues and 
human factors related hurdles have brought forth a range of research ef­
fmis to help to mitigate or resolve these challenges. Regulations and leg­
islation play a significant role in controlling or restricting the use of 
UASs in the NAS. Cunently there appears to be a contraposition of sen­
timent between the Federal Aviation Administration and Congress on the 
inclusion of UASs in the NAS. Congress has called for the adoption of 
UAS operations in the NAS by 2015 yet the FAA has placed an assort­
ment of restrictions and obstacles on the certification and use of UASs 
which severely inhibit research and development activities. Yet another 
setback has recently surfaced when the FAA suspended its selection pro­
cess for UAS test sites due to privacy concerns. This new obstacle has 
the potential to further delay UAS integration. The privacy debate is in­
herent to American society. So important is the issue that it is covered in 
the Fourth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution. Public outcry concern­
ing unwarranted or unknown observation is nothing new. With the ad­
vent of new surveillance technologies and techniques, concern that they 
may be used in violation of personal rights and protections has grown. 
Examples include wiretapping, electronic surveillance, video monitoring, 
and other types of law enforcement and related agency activities. This 
study identified themes among the dissent for such technologies as well 
as for UAS integration. Further, commonalities and occunences in pre­
vious privacy-related confrontations were characterized in order to serve 
as a guide for efforts to resolve the UAS privacy quandary. 
INTRODUCTION 
It is foreseeable that the next generation of the flight will contain a great emphasis on 
Unmanned Aerial Systems (UASs). In today's environment, these systems are primarily 
operated by the military. UASs have been saving money, time and most importantly 
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lives by stealthily and fearlessly penetrating enemy defenses, performing overt and covert 
surveillance, and in some cases, executing successful missile strikes on enemy targets 
behind enemy lines. Although the current applications are primarily limited to military 
operations, it is expected that in the near future, these applications could extend to a wide 
variety of other types of civilian �ervices including search and rescue operations, weather 
research, homeland security operations, law enforcement operations, crop dusting, and oil 
pipeline inspection. Soon UASs will be participating in "aerial photography, surveying 
land and crops, and monitoring forest fires and environmental conditions" to name a few. 
Congressional mandate for UAS integration and operation 
One of the strategic objectives for F AA's NextGen initiative is to "make the national 
airspace system (NAS) scalable and flexible enough to incorporate various and new types 
of aircraft", including unmanned aircraft. The FAA is currently working on defining ac­
ceptable UAS performance standards and procedures to mitigate existing restrictions as­
sociated with UAS operations. The wide spread interest in the UAS arena is quickly in­
creasing within the aviation community; the task of integrating UAS into the NAS has 
resulted in much attention and the creation of many dilemmas for the various different 
groups of stakeholders and researchers. Nevertheless, there are many critical issues that 
need to be addressed before a safe and acceptable integration of UAS into the NAS can 
take place, including technical issues, Human Factors issues, and ethical issues. 
Among these factors, government regulation and legislation play a significant role in 
restricting the use of UAS in the NAS. According to the FAA Modernization and Re­
form Act of 2012, the bill provides $63 .4 billion to fund the agency through 2015, includ­
ing approximately $11 billion towards the F AA's proposed Next Generation ("NextGen") 
air traffic control system. It is also the first FAA funding bill to discuss integration of 
UASs into the NAS. Title III, Subtitle B states, among other things, that the FAA will 
have until September 30, 2015 to open the NAS to civil and commercial UAS aircraft. 
This Congressional mandate requires the FAA to work on a roadmap and plan to issue 
licensees to domestic entities to operate in areas that were previously only reserved for 
manned aircraft. As for the FAA, there are many hurdles to overcome to achieve this ob­
jective. Some of these hurdles include: 1 
• Ground control station issues/operator issues - these issues revolve around the
question of how many operators should be present to control the UAS.
• UAS operations certification and UAS operator selection: what attributes/skills
are necessary for operators to possess?
• Validation of the sense-and-avoid technology: what are acceptable industrial
standard for those sense-and avoid technologies?
• UAS call signs: how to design the call signs for location and mission.
• UAS communication with ATC: how to establish a standard for UAS and ATC
communication for safety and security.
Public concerns and outcries for protection of privacy 
While these are the most commonly studied factors for the integration of UAS into the 
NAS, another setback has recently emerged as the FAA suspended its selection process 
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of UAS test sites due to concerns from the public over privacy issues. This right is recog­
nized by the U.S. Supreme Court as protecting a general right to privacy. As for the use 
of UAS, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that individuals do not generally have Fourth 
Amendment rights with respect to aerial surveillance because of "the ability that anyone 
might have to observe what could be viewed from the air." There are more and more pub­
lic concerns about the increasing use of UAS in the open airspace, despite the fact that 
most of the operations are government related and legal. For example, a recent protest led 
by the American Civil Liberty Union (ACLU) in Seattle, Washington resulted in the Se­
attle Police Department ending UAV operations for the city as concerns were raised in­
volving invasion of privacy issues. In many states, legislators have voiced their concerns 
for the potential for privacy invasion posed by the wide use of UASs, worried about the 
personal information that could be collected by these small size drones. These and other 
examples have illustrated the growing concerns of the U.S. public as the use and potential 
abuse of UAS within the borders of the United States becomes more and more of a reali­
ty. 
Civil rights such as privacy have been a major cause of concern for almost every gov­
ernment and commercial system put into use, and it is a critical issue that the UAS com­
munity must face and ethically resolve before considering the agenda of integrating UAS 
into NAS. As the ACLU has pointed out, "we need a system of rules to ensure that Amer­
icans can enjoy the benefits of this technology without bringing our country a large step 
closer to a "surveillance society" in which every move is monitored, tracked, recorded, 
and scrutinized by the authorities. An outline of protections that would protect Ameri­
cans' privacy in the coming world of UAS" is in demand. 2 Without this outline of pro­
tections to safeguard Americans' privacy, public acceptance of UAS technology operat­
ing within the borders of the United States will be difficult to achieve. 
REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
Privacy 
Brief background on the Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution 
For centuries, the U.S. citizens have enjoyed the protection of specific rights provided 
by the United States Constitution. Of particular concern today is the potential erosion of 
those protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment concerning the right of privacy and 
protection from unwarranted search and seizure. In the United States, the Fourth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution states "The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated. " The concept of protection of an individual's right to privacy is not out­
dated or obsolete by any means. The Fourth Amendment is as important and valid today 
as the day it was conceived and written into the Bill of Rights that was drafted by the first 
Congress on September 25, 1789, over 222 years ago.3 The problem is that the technolo­
gy being employed did not exist 222 years ago, and the framers of the Bill of Rights nev­
er envisioned this technology or how its capabilities could be used against individuals. 
The Fourth Amendment was designed and worded within the context of technology and 
capabilities in existence in the late 1789, not 2012. The issues at the center of the UAS 
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privacy debate revolve around: 1) the technology being used, 2) the capabilities of that 
new technology, 3) the manner in which that technology is being used, 4) the reason it is 
being used, and 5) the environment in which the technology is being used. 
The concerns for privacy by U.S. citizens dates back to the American Revolution 
when representatives of the British government abused the "Writ of Assistance", which 
was a type of general search warrant used without cause, justification or concern for the 
rights or privacy of the individual. Today, in order to be able to enter and search an indi­
vidual's home, the law enforcement agency must appear before a court of law and present 
probable cause as to why a legal search warrant should be issued, and name specific peo­
ple and items of interest which are believed to be present and related to the specific inves­
tigation under consideration. 
Interestingly enough, UAS technology being proposed for commercial use is not being 
questioned nearly as much as when the discussion turns to UAS technology being used 
by local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies.4 A recent June 2012 poll conducted 
by Monmouth University reported that 42 percent of those sampled were very concerned 
about their own privacy if U.S. law enforcement started using UASs with high tech cam­
eras, while 15 percent said they were not at all concerned. However, the same poll report­
ed that of those sampled, 80 percent said they supported the use of UAS for search and 
rescue missions while 67 percent said they oppose the use of UAS to issue speeding tick­
ets. 5 
The use of UAS technology and the environment in which they operate causes a great 
deal of confusion in terms of what is legal and what is illegal. For example, does a law 
enforcement officer (UAS operator) need probable cause to operate a UAS with a high 
resolution camera over an individual's home and fenced in yard? If they see something 
illegal during that flight, do they now have the right to enter a home or property to per­
form a search? These are questions that will probably be answered in the near future on a 
case by case basis as they occur in society. 
Legislation 
The most notable event in recent history that has contributed to the expansion of gov­
ernment powers has been the coordinated terrorist attack against the United States on 
September 11, 2001. Citing the need to increase the ability of the U.S. Government law 
enforcement and intelligence communities to be able to collect information that may help 
prevent future terrorist attacks, and thereby better protect the public, the USA PATRIOT 
Act of 2001 was introduced and signed into law by Congress and then President Bush. 
Many people favored this expansion of power by the Federal Government, but some saw 
it as a necessary evil that had great potential to erode the protections afforded law abiding 
citizens under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. 
But the real resistance to the potential erosion of the Fourth Amendment came years 
later with the advent of UAS technology and the obvious surveillance capabilities this 
technology possessed. Other acts of congress began to be introduced to reinforce the var­
ious protections provided under the Fourth Amendment such as the Preserving Freedom 
from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012, the Preserving American Privacy Act of 
2012, and the Farmer's Privacy Act of 2012. The concern for invasion of privacy and 
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general abuse of power on the part of State and Federal law enforcement agencies along 
with enhanced technologies and increased surveillance capabilities seems to have sparked 
a real effort on the part of the public, the ACLU, and some politicians to reinforce Fourth 
Amendment protections and counter the potential abuse of technology presented by UAS 
surveillance capabilities. 
USA PATRIOT Act of2001 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001 was signed into law by 
President George W. Bush on October 26, 2001.6 The act was a response to the terrorist 
attacks of September 11 which significantly weakened or removed restrictions on law 
enforcement agencies ability to gather intelligence within the United States against sus­
pected terrorists. The immediate reaction to the USA PA TRI OT Act of 2001 was over­
whelmingly positive and supportive. It passed in the Senate by a vote of 98 - 1 and in the 
Hours of Representatives by a vote of 357 - 66.7 Clearly, the American people and gov­
ernment of the United States was focused on taking steps to ensure that events similar to 
the September 11 attacks would not happen again. Additionally, the U.S. Government 
needed to reassure the American people that everything was under control and their gov­
ernment was taking positive steps to ensure their safety. 
Embedded within the USA PATRIOT Act were 10 sections, Title I - X, which greatly 
enhanced the power and authority of law enforcement and intelligence agencies through­
out the country. Without going into extreme detail on each section, the 10 sections are 
listed below:8 
• Title I: Enhancing Domestic Security Against Terrorism
• Title II: Enhanced Surveillance Procedures
• Title III: International Money Laundering Abatement and Anti-Terrorist Financing
Act of2001
• Title IV: Protecting the Border
• Title V: Removing Obstacles to Investigating Terrorism
• Title VI: Providing for Victims of Terrorism, Public Safety Officers, and Their
Families
• Title VII: Increased Information Sharing for Critical Infrastructure Protection
• Title VIII: Strengthening the Criminal Laws Against Terrorism
• Title IX: Improved Intelligence
• Title X: Miscellaneous
All of the 10 titles included in the USA PA TRI OT Act of 2001 are administrative 
and/or supportive of enhancing anti-terrorist initiatives to one degree or another. Title 
III, for example, deals with providing the resources and tools needed to identify, track, 
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and freeze money laundering and financial activities that are linked to the funding ofter­
rorist organizations and/or terrorist activities. Title IV deals with taking the steps neces­
sary to protect and secure the borders of the United States. Title IV does not address ac­
tual securing of open borders to prevent illegal crossing of the border into the United 
States, but rather deals with the denial of admission, verification of immigrant status, cus­
tody of aliens involved in terrorism, and eventual deportation or removal of the individual 
from the United States. Title VI deals with provisions for providing donations, payment, 
and support to victims of terrorism including the general public, public safety officers, 
and their families. Titles I, VII, VIII, IX, and X involve similar administrative and/or 
supportive guidance, but do not necessarily directly impact privacy or have any direct 
impact on the protections afforded by the Fourth Amendment. 
Title II, however, potentially expands the powers of the Federal Government in ways 
that can easily undermine the Fourth Amendment protections if interpreted or imple­
mented improperly or over-zealously by law enforcement agencies and the intelligence 
communities of the United States. Title II discusses enhanced surveillance procedures 
and specifically enumerates powers listed below: 7
• Section 206: Allows for roving wiretaps under the Foreign Intelligence Surveil­
lance Act, which allows the issuance of a court order the government to employ
electronic surveillance of a foreign power or agent of a foreign power.
• Section 209: Allows law enforcement to seize voice mail messages pursuant to a
warrant.
• Section 210: Allows law enforcement to subpoena additional subscriber records
from service providers such as "records of sessions and durations" and "means and
source of payment."
• Section 215: Allows the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation "access to
certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism inves­
tigations" where such investigation is to be "conducted under guidelines approved
by the Attorney General."
• Section 216: Allows a Pen Trap, a device that records the numbers dialed but not
the content of the conversation, to be applied to internet dialing and email.
• Section 220: Allows for "Nation Wide Service of Search Warrant for Electronic
Evidence."
Clearly, on the surface, no one would object to "enhanced surveillance procedures" to 
help ensure the safety of the American people. However, recent news events have shown 
that these "enhanced surveillance procedures" can be interpreted very broadly and used to 
research and investigate data pertaining to all Americans, not just "foreign powers or 
agents of a foreign power." The recent National Security Agency (NSA) phone records 
scandal used portions of the USA PATRIOT Act of 2001 which references the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act to obtain a court order allowing collection of data from 
phone records from all Verizon customers (foreign and domestic) for the purpose of 
metadata analysis of information pertaining to those records including what phone num-
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ber was called, what time the call was made, and duration of the call. In theory, the court 
order was obtained to research and investigate potential links between foreign entities, 
known terrorist entities and individuals, and suspected terrorist entities and individuals. 
In reality, this revelation has led to a renewed debate over the legality and policy merits 
of broad and indiscriminate government surveillance of Americans under the guise of na­
tional security.9
It is difficult to be certain as to the legality of this action since both the details of the 
program and legal rulings on it are classified as secret. But civil liberties groups argue the 
program exceeds the powers Congress has granted to the executive branch, and that such 
a broad surveillance program is inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment.9
The program appears to be partly based on Section 215 of the Patriot Act, which al­
lows the government to obtain business records that are relevant to an ongoing terrorism 
investigation. That's a pretty permissive standard, but the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
argues that Congress intended to authorize information requests relevant to a specific ter­
rorism investigation. Demanding the phone records of every person in the United States 
seems inconsistent with that requirement since it is highly unlikely that ALL Americans 
are terrorists. 9
H.R. 5925 -Preserving Fn;edom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012 
Oddly enough, critics of the potential erosion of Fourth Amendment protections from 
legislation such as the USA PA TRI OT Act of 2001 were fairly quiet until the realization 
that electronic and physical surveillance was more feasible than ever before. With the 
advent of sophisticated surveillance equipment and the capability to deploy that equip­
ment virtually anywhere, anytime in a covert manner (UASs performing surveillance si­
lently from height of hundreds or thousands of feet in the air), concern began to grow on 
a national level. 
One piece of legislation introduced on June 7, 2012 was H.R. 5925, the "Preserving 
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012." The purpose of this bill was to 
"protect individual privacy against unwarranted governmental intrusion through the use 
of unmanned aerial vehicles commonly called drones and for other purposes. " The Pre­
serving Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012 is a simple 3 page bill that 
reinforces the Fourth Amendment as specifically related to the use of "drones" or UASs 
involved in surveillance operations on U.S. Citizens. Section 2, Prohibited Use of 
Drones states, "Except as provided in Section 3, a person or entity acting under the au­
thority of the United States shall not use a drone to gather evidence or other information 
pertaining to criminal conduct or conduct in violation of a regulation except to the extent 
authorized in a warrant issued under the procedures described in the Federal Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. " Section 3 lists exceptions to Section 2 such as patrol of borders, 
exigent circumstances (such as when law enforcement parties possess reasonable suspi­
cion that swift action is needed to prevent loss of life or damage to property, or to fore­
stall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence) or to counter high risk 
of a terrorist attack by a specific individual or organization when credible intelligence 
exists.10
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This bill was introduced on June 7, 2012 and was referred to committee (died) on June 
7, 2012. It was reintroduced as H.R. 972 on March 05, 2013. H.R. 972 was referred to 
committee on May 22, 2013 and is currently pending committee review.11 This current
bill, according to GovTrack.us, has very little chance of getting past committee and very 
little chance of being enacted. 
HR. 6199 -Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012 
The Preserving American Privacy Act of 2012 was very similar to the Preserving 
Freedom from Unwarranted Surveillance Act of 2012. The act states that drones cannot 
be used domestically by law enforcement or for surveillance of a U.S. national or real 
property owned by that national except pursuant to a warrant and in the investigation of a 
felony, and that information obtained in violation of that section using UASs may not be 
used in a criminal proceeding before a Federal court.12 
This bill was introduced on July 25, 2012 and was referred to committee (died) on Ju­
ly 25, 2012. It was reintroduced as H.R. 637 on February 13, 2013. H.R. 637 was re­
ferred to committee on February 13, 2013 and is currently pending committee review.13 
This current bill, according to GovTrack.us, has approximately a 60% chance of getting 
past committee and approximately a 16% chance of being enacted. 
So, it appears that although the American public and some American politicians are 
strongly supportive of the Fourth Amendment and acutely aware of the potential erosion 
of Fourth Amendment protections with the introduction and use of UAS technology, 
there is very little desire to actually pass any legislation reinforcing the Fourth Amend­
ment through legislation at this time. 
FAA Test Site Selection: Privacy Concerns 
Included in the original wording of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 
is a requirement to develop a comprehensive plan to safely accelerate the integration of 
civil unmanned aircraft systems into the NAS, and that plan shall be implemented as soon 
as practicable, but not later than September 30, 2015. Also included in that same section 
is a requirement to establish 6 test ranges around the United States that will be used for 
research, development, and testing of UAS technologies, policies, procedures, and guide­
lines toward the safe integration of UAS into the NAS. 
Shortly after the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012 was signed into law, the 
FAA began to implement plans for test site selection and quickly ran into problems due 
to complaints received related to privacy issues and UAS use. In a letter addressed to the 
Congressional UA V Caucus, The FAA Acting Administrator, Michael Huerta, stated that 
"Our target was to have 6 test sites by the end of 2012. However, increasing the use of 
UAS in our airspace also raises privacy issues, and these issues will need to be addressed 
as unmanned aircraft are safely integrated." 14, 15 
The FAA and others have consistently stated and maintained that the FAA is charged 
with ensuring safe integration of UASs into the NAS, and that does not include catering 
to or developing regulation or guidelines related to privacy concerns. Critics of the FAAs 
decision to include privacy considerations into the test site criteria say that federal, state 
and local laws regarding the protection of an individual's right to privacy already exist, 
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including the Fourth Amendment. There are over 20 references to safety in Title III, 
Subsection B, but not one reference to privacy or privacy related concerns. 16 Critics of
the F AAs decision to include privacy guidelines are mostly politicians who want to move 
the initiative along as quickly as possible in an attempt to secure a test site in their dis­
tricts, or companies associated with the UAS industry in some way that see privacy as 
another hurdle or regulation that will slow things down causing more regulatory delays 
while less complicated, faster moving initiatives in other countries claim large shares of 
the global UAS market. However, the FAA maintains that the safe integration of UAS 
into the NAS must be thoughtful and well planned. 
The FAA anticipates that test site operator privacy practices as discussed in their pri­
vacy policies will help inform the dialogue among policymakers, privacy advocates, and 
the industry regarding broader questions concerning the use of UAS technologies. The 
privacy requirements proposed here are specifically designed for the operation of the 
UAS Test Sites. They are not intended to pre-determine the long-term policy and regula­
tory framework under which commercial UASs would operate. Rather, they aim to assure 
maximum transparency of privacy policies associated with UAS test site operations in 
order to engage all stakeholders in discussion about which privacy issues are raised by 
UAS operations and how law, public policy, and the industry practices should respond to 
h . 
. 
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Case law and privacy 
It is not uncommon for there to be confusion or uncertainty when actions or proce­
dures conducted by individuals or government entities take place in untested circum­
stances. This is particularly an issue when new technologies are utilized in the conduct of 
criminal enforcement proceedings. Further, when the public learns of new and different 
ways in which they may be subject to observation, apprehension about general privacy 
typically arises. Because of the nascent nature of the use ofUAS in the U.S., it is not sur­
prising that privacy has become a considerable topic of concern among the public. Be­
cause UASs are a relatively new technology, it is impossible to assume that existing laws 
or interpretations thereof are adequate to manage their use in observation of the public 
and even more importantly, the ability to use evidence collected by UASs in criminal 
proceedings. At the same time, it is not fair for UAS opponents to claim that these devic­
es be prohibited to be used in any way related to human surveillance. In the past, when 
new technologies or procedures have been introduced, namely in the collection of evi­
dence by law enforcement or other government agencies, resolutions were only provided 
upon the testing of such in various court cases. 
When these types of challenges occur, legal precedents are generated from the deci­
sions. Stanford University defines a legal precedent as: "the decision of a court ( or other 
adjudicative body) that has a special legal significance. That significance lies in the 
court's decision being regarded as having practical, and not merely theoretical, authority 
over the content of the law."18 These decisions lay the ground for future cases heard on
similar topics, as "if there are good reasons to believe that an earlier case was correctly 
decided, and if the facts in a later case are the same as those in the earlier case, then there 
are good reasons for believing that the same decision would be correct in the later 
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case."1s Once precedents (case law) have been established, they begin to "have practical 
authority because they are regarded as partly constituting the law. Simplifying somewhat, 
the law is what the court stated it to be because the court stated it to be such."1s Prece­
dents are established by courts at various levels, both state and federal, but often pivotal 
cases end up in the U.S. Supreme Court. Such instances have the most wide ranging in­
fluence as they essentially supersede lower court decisions. 
Many cases related to privacy as well as search and seizure have ended up in the Su­
preme Court. The resultant decisions have provided lower courts further guidance on how 
to handle the collection of evidence and to evaluate the legality thereof. In the past, any 
time law enforcement agencies have used novel techniques or technologies, they have 
seemingly ended up in a variety of level of appeals for consideration. Even if a precedent 
is established, it is not guaranteed that even minor changes in the way evidence may be 
collected will be considered to be under the same case law. In order for a precedent to 
apply, a court must decide if the present case is "identical" or "relatively the same" as the 
precedent case. 1s Even if a lower court decides that this is or is not the circumstance with 
the present challenge, it does not guarantee that this decision will not be challenged by a 
higher court. This cycle of case trials, evaluations, and reevaluations has become very 
common among the introduction of neophyte surveillance technologies and therefore 
should present no surprise that such is likely to occur in cases surrounding UASs. To un­
derstand how current surveillance precedents have been created, the road to present day 
case law must be examined. 
General surveillance. The seminal document advocating for the privacy protection of 
citizens of the U.S. resides within the Fourth Amendment of the United States which 
states that "the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef­
fects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants 
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. "2 Much inter­
pretation has been made by law enforcement, citizens, and most importantly, by courts, 
as to what is considered to be "unreasonable searches and seizures." Also, debate has 
centered on the term "probable cause" as well as just about every other statement within 
the amendment. 19 One of the earliest tests to the amendment itself was in the 1886 case of 
Boyd v. United States. In this case, the precedent to what is today considered reasonable 
in terms of search and seizure was partially developed. Being forced to produce business 
records was determined by the Supreme Court to be unreasonable, as other means of 
remedy were available.1s 
One of the principal guiding cases in terms of admissibility of evidence can be found 
in Weeks v. United States. In this case, search and seizure of the plaintiff was deemed to 
be unwarranted and thus illegal. The court decided that evidence that has been obtained 
illegally cannot be admitted. This case has provided individuals protection from ques­
tionable evidence collection techniques and technologies over the years and is still cited 
in cases concerning illegal gathering of evidence. 19 A formative case involving probable 
cause, Brinegar v. United States, established that police, given obvious indications that an 
individual is conducting a crime - in this case a heavily loaded vehicle being driven by a 
known and previously convicted liquor smuggler being operated in a suspicious location 
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- allows for the conduct of certain types of inquiry and search.20 The courts have also ad­
vocated for the ability for police to search even without a warrant specific to such a
search. In United States v. Rabinowitz, the court found that an arrest warrant in itself
deemed probable cause and subsequent, reasonable search of premises within control of
the accused could be conducted.21
Further honing what is deemed reasonable and probable cause, Aguilar v. Texas creat­
ed the precedent that warrant requests must be based upon credible informants and/or re­
liable information. While definitions of these standards may vary, there must be more 
than hearsay or circumstantial evidence to provide the basis for search and seizure.22 Po­
lice have also been limited in what they can provide as evidence based upon how and 
where such proof is collected. Without proper probable cause, evidence gathered inci­
dental to an arrest may not be, in fact, admissible, as was the case in Beck v. Ohio.23 Most 
subsequent case law, however, generally accepts evidence gathered post-arrest such as in 
"pat downs" and personal possession items. Also, if individuals consent to search, in 
most cases, the evidence found thereafter has been found to be admissible.24
Electronic monitoring and observation. With the advent of more sophisticated com­
munications and the ability to "tap" or monitor them, the issue of privacy truly took on a 
different meaning. For instance, could talking on a telephone be considered to be a pri­
vate transaction between speakers? In one of the first cases involving evidence collected 
via a wiretap of phone lines, Olmstead v. United States, the Supreme Court found that 
tapping was not considered a search or seizure. The justices noted what was lacking was 
a "material ingredient" meaning there was no physical removal or confiscation.25 Proba­
bly one of the most important precedent cases related to privacy was Katz v. United 
States which challenged the aforementioned Olmstead case. In this dispute, the plaintiff 
stated that a conversation within a telephone booth should be considered private and im­
mune from monitoring. The court favored the plaintiff yet they noted that places are not 
protected - instead personal privacy is what is to be considered. Thus even if an individu­
al is visible in public, such as in a telephone booth, this does not mean that they lose all 
expectations of privacy. In fact, that is the nature of a telephone booth, so an individual 
can enter it to have a conversation that they reasonably expect to be private. Thus this 
case created the Harlan two-part test for determining privacy protection: 1. A person must 
have an actual expectation for privacy and 2. that this expectation is reasonable. 26 
Since Katz, reasonable expectation for privacy has been interpreted in a variety of 
ways. In general, when someone is in their residence, they are afforded the presumption 
of privacy. This apparently even applies to use of technologies that "pierce" into the pri­
vacy of one's home. In the case of Kyllo v. United States, Federal agents used thermal 
imaging devices to detect heat from growing lamps used to produce marijuana within the 
plaintiffs home. The Supreme Court determined that such evidence could not normally 
have been detected without a warranted search of the physical interior of the home. This 
case essentially placed a limit on the use of advanced technologies and monitoring devic­
es on the ability to infiltrate instances deemed to be reasonably private. However, as the 
justices noted in this case, citing Katz, police are still able to use "plain sight" and other 
reasonable "senses" to procure evidence.27 A case that precedes Kyllo exemplifies this 
extra "loophole" available to police - United Slates v. Cusumano. Similar to Kyllo, the 
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defendant's home was "searched" by a thermal device. The difference in this case was 
substantial other evidence was used to provide probable cause, such as power usage, ad­
mission of the defendant as to owning growing lamps, gardening supplies, payment of 
rent in cash, and the procurement of additional electrical supplies to the basement through 
the services of a professional electrician. The courts found that aside from the thermal 
evidence, other indications existed that were suspicious enough to merit closer scrutiny. 28
Whilst case law indicates that individuals should be immune from the use of advanced 
technologies to infiltrate the home, precedent does not support the notion that all parts of 
an individual's home or adjacent property are immune from observation. 
Once law enforcement started to use aerial observation, several cases have been heard 
at the state and Federal Supreme Court levels to argue the admissibility of evidence gar­
nered from such over-flights. United States v. Hester defined two terms of significance 
related to aerial surveillance: curtilage and open fields. Curtilage is defined as the areas 
adjacent to a home, such as a yard. Whilst curtilage is subject to privacy protection from 
a spectator walking on the ground if it is properly hidden, e.g. with a solid, high fence, it 
is not protected from incidental aerial observation from above.29
Several important precedents were established relating to privacy, curtilage, and ob­
servation techniques and technologies in California v. Ciraolo. In this case, a police heli­
copter, working on a tip, overflew the defendant's residence at 1,000 feet in navigable 
airspace. Even though the defendant had a ten-foot privacy fence, this observation was 
made from above in plain sight. Photographs were taken using a standard 35mm camera 
to document the growth of marijuana plants in the defendant's yard. The use of aerial 
surveillance to view illegal activities in plain sight using conventional technologies (i.e. 
those readily available to the public) was considered acceptable and the ruling against the 
defendant was upheld.30 Similarly, in Dow Chemical Company v. United States, Envi­
ronmental Protection Agency personnel used an aircraft to overfly a chemical plant, se­
cured with fencing, utilizing mapping cameras to photograph the facility. Evidence from 
this flight was used for EPA enforcement purposes. Because the plant was considered 
"open fields," the aircraft was flown within navigable airspace, and utilized non­
enhanced photographic means of data collection, the evidence collected on such a flight 
was deemed usable in court.31 Florida v. Riley narrowed the concept of presumed privacy 
of a residence. During a flight at 400 feet, a police helicopter observed an opening in a 
greenhouse in an obscured backyard. Through this gap, marijuana was seen growing in 
the building. All observations were made with the naked eye. The Supreme Court found 
that this was not an illegal search in the scope of the law. 32 Also, precedent has deter­
mined that almost any actions in public places to be observable without a warrant. Even 
video observation is acceptable, as the crime deterrent brought forth by the installation of 
such cameras outweighed rights to privacy.33
Court decisions have created limitations to aerial surveillance, however. One such lim­
itation was made apparent in Colorado v. Pollock in which it was determined that obser­
vation flights below reasonable navigational altitudes did, in fact, constitute an illegal 
search. The court noted that "rarely, if ever would ... normal air traffic in or near the de­
fendant's residence be as low as 200 feet."34 Thus there is a limit to how low or intrusive 
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aerial observations can take place. In a recent decision, however, a U.S. District Court 
found that the evidence collected from the installation of video cameras on private prop­
erty by police was admissible.35
In general, precedent has also prohibited the use of "dragnet" type observation, i.e. 
prolonged, constant surveillance, except under the confines of a warrant. In both United 
States v. Knotts and United States v. Karo, the allowance for tracking of individuals was 
deemed permissible.36• 37 These cases have also been cited to support GPS location of in­
dividuals as long as such is conducted with a warrant. In Knotts, Justice Rehnquist stated 
"twenty-four hour surveillance of any citizen of this country will be possible, without ju­
dicial knowledge or supervision. But the fact is that the reality hardly suggests abuse; if 
such dragnet-type law enforcement practices as respondent envisions should eventually 
occur, there will be time enough then to determine whether different constitutional prin­
ciples may be applicable." Thus simply because a technology exists does not mean that 
there should be laws to control their uses - instead the resultant data that may be collect­
ed should be the subject of potential control or limitation. 36 
While this description of case law is not exhaustive, it does highlight the key cases 
related to current standards for privacy and surveillance. It is evident that there is a long 
and oft challenged line of cases that have taken place in order to form present day prece­
dents. And due to the ever-changing legal landscape and contestations of the law, it is 
likely that UASs will provide fodder for further wranglings. 
DISCUSSION 
Potential application of case law 
The concept of privacy and the legality of various types of surveillance have signifi­
cant precedent cases to reference in future proceedings. Yet, even in light of current case 
law, it is apparent from the historical trend in such legal actions that precedent specific to 
UAS will likely need to be set. This is likely first to be challenged upon the premise that 
UAS surveillance is not "identical" or "relatively the same" as other types of observation. 
This test could theoretically go either way with the end result perhaps being specific to 
the individual case or situation. On one hand it could be argued that UASs do pose a 
unique threat to privacy, as alluded to in Colorado v. Pollock, for example their stealth 
nature, ability to maneuver into spaces and positions unable to be reached by manned air­
craft, and capability to loiter for extended periods, thus requiring a distinctive evaluation 
by the court. Contrarily, it could be argued that UASs do not pose an idiosyncratic means 
of observation and as long as they adhere to current standards for aerial observation, no 
further manipulation of precedent would be required as was made clear by Justice 
Rehnquist in Knotts. 
A decisive issue that will influence how UASs will be used in surveillance relates to 
the legality of the collection of evidence. As was set in Weeks, special care will need to 
be taken to insure that data collection by UAS conforms to the standards within all cur­
rent precedent cases. This precaution is necessary to insure that evidence is not sup­
pressed due to the conformance of the collection with previous cases. This may necessi­
tate tests to probable cause and warrantless observation. It is certainly reasonable to be-
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lieve that observations by UASs could in themselves provide probable cause, such as cir­
cumstances noted in Brinegar or Ciraolo, providing the proof necessary to allow for 
more intrusive means or even a warrant. Considering Ciraolo and Dow Chemical Com­
pany, warrantless surveillance could easily take place over residences, of curtilage, and of 
open fields which certainly may provide probable cause or even hard evidence for poten­
tial prosecution. 
One potential sequence that could ensue, relying on concepts in the Brinegar, Rab­
inowitz, Aguilar, and Beck cases, is that UASs could be sent on a mission to observe, 
purposefully or not, a certain locale. During this surveillance a suspicious circumstance is 
observed giving probable cause. Depending upon the situation, this could be used to pull 
over a car or approach an individual for further questioning. If an arrest then takes place, 
all evidence collected at the point of arrest would likely be admissible. Alternatively, evi­
dence from the observation could be used to generate a warrant query. Once the warrant 
is secured, most evidence would be accepted in court proceedings especially if following 
a subsequent arrest. It is therefore plausible that challenges will come to the ability of 
UASs to establish probable cause yet as long as these devices are operated within the 
confines of current case standards, it is likely that that such uses would be hard to chal­
lenge successfully. 
Additional standards are likely to be considered applicable to UAS surveillance. One 
is the Harlan test for privacy. It seems that individuals inside their residence, a place of 
personal sanctity, should be safe from intrusive observation so visions of one opening 
their curtains to the sight of a quad-copter UAS hovering just outside is more fiction than 
fact. Yet individuals being in clear view either in curtilage or even in an open window 
may be subject to observation, as was the case in the "incidental" viewing of evidence in 
Riley. Additional challenge to what is considered to be an "expectation for privacy" may 
surface when UASs are used in and around a residence or other "private" structure. 
Concerns about high tech surveillance systems that are readily available on UAS plat­
forms being used in observation or collection of data/evidence also are unjustified. Cur­
rent precedent seems to support protection from intrusive technologies such as thermal 
imaging, facial recognition, night vision, and other systems that are not typically availa­
ble to the general public - the current accepted standard for such technologies.X14x2o Alt­
hough with the lowering costs of advanced imaging technologies, it is possible that one 
day in the near future the argument could be made that, say, night vision systems are 
within practical reach of an average individual, thus could become more likely to be ad­
missible. Again, this will likely need to be hashed out in the court system. Further, it is 
conceivable that a naked-eye over-flight observation of suspicious activity could bring 
forth probable cause to pursue further action including the obtaining of a warrant for the 
use of advanced technologies which has typically held up to court inspection. 
Lastly, the stealth and mobility of UASs will likely be limited by the standards in Pol­
lock, Riley, Ciraolo, and Dow Chemical Company. In particular, the concept of reasona­
ble expectation of overflight and navigable airspace will be critical to admissibility of 
collected evidence. It seems that an altitude of operation below 400 to 500 feet would be 
considered unacceptably intrusive. This would certainly limit the ability of the UAS, us-
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ing only conventional visual cameras - at best with zoom capabilities - to closely observe 
or detect malicious activities or materials. Clearly public fears of UASs buzzing outside 
their bedroom windows again appear to be farfetched. 
Forcing the hand - getting a case into court 
It is apparent that new challenges must be made to UAS usage to clarify and solidify 
case law that may be applicable to such operations. Although there may be apprehension 
within UAS manufacturers, purchasers, and users about court challenges, it is actually in 
the best interest of all parties for such a "force of hand." With a challenge to the use of 
UAS will come clarification concerning what types of operations, technologies, and 
methods of surveillance will be tolerated by the courts. This is will give stakeholders sol­
id ground on which to stand for future operations or allow for adjustments in the way 
such technologies are used. This is certainly better than the nebulous environment that 
exists today, pending approval of UAS use in domestic airspace. It may even be to the 
advantage of UAS stakeholders, particularly manufacturers, to see the use of UASs come 
before the courts. Why? Because it makes no sense to invest in something which may be 
illegal to use essentially making the device useless or the market for such extremely 
small. On the contrary, if UAS observation and technologies are upheld, it will open to 
the door to a broader audience of purchasers and make the job of salespersons significant­
ly easier. Although challenges to UAS are already in the works, stakeholders should be 
open, if not pursue, the establishment of case law precedents. 
CONCLUSION 
Just as it was impossible for the framers of the U.S. Constitution to predict what tech­
nological development might cause sections of their document to become obsolete or 
meaningless, it is impossible for anyone today to envision what technological break­
through may occur in the near future that may make these debates on privacy and UAS 
technology moot or obsolete. Some people feel that the technology used makes no differ­
ence and that existing laws, rules, and regulations that guard an individual's privacy are 
sufficient to handle any issue or challenge that may arise. Others believe that new tech­
nology and creative uses of that technology offer an opportunity or a gray area where the 
rules may be temporarily reinterpreted until they are challenged in court. Still others be­
lieve that new technology and new capabilities are a necessary step in updating current 
laws to make them less ambiguous and enhance protections at the same time. 
Many laws are created based on the current state of technology, availability of that 
technology, and affordability of that technology. There is little debate surrounding the 
surveillance capabilities or potential erosion of Fourth Amendment protections when full 
size, manned helicopters are used by law enforcement agencies because they are known 
technology, their capabilities are a known quantity (at least for now), they are expensive 
to purchase, operate and maintain (not everyone can get one), and where they can fly is 
strictly regulated by the FAA and airspace regulations. UASs on the other hand are un­
known quantities from almost every perspective. Their technology and current capabili­
ties are known only to the military because they have been the primary user and develop-
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er of UAS and UAS sensor technology to date, they are affordable and will become more 
affordable as the widespread use and demand increases, and where they can fly and oper­
ate is not strictly regulated by anyone at the current time. 
Drones or UASs are nothing more than machines or tools to be used for a variety of 
purposes and in a variety of ways. As is often the case, the technology may not be the 
problem, but what people plan to do with that technology is what must be regulated. 
Careful and thoughtful development of new laws that consider the advanced capabilities 
and creative implementation of this new technology is one way to mitigate abuse and 
prevent erosion of Fourth Amendment rights and protections. Laws can be developed that 
consider a wide variety of situations and circumstances, but laws cannot be developed 
that cover every possible scenario. 
Technologies such as the internet and cell phones have advanced at a far faster rate 
than can be reasonably regulated. As a result, much of the legislation regulating to these 
two areas was produced after the technology was available and already in use for many 
years.38 With UAS technology, early consideration is being given to the potential uses
and abuses of this technology in an effort to maximize legal commercialization of this 
technology while minimizing the potential abuse of this technology. This practice of ear­
ly consideration coupled with thorough and thoughtful design of legislation should be 
encouraged and will result in the creation of a solid foundation for the future preservation 
of Fourth Amendment protections. 
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